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Abstract
Research and Development (R&D) is critical to the long-term survival of many firms.
However, R&D has become a target of corporate downsizing, in part, because the costs of R&D are
easily observed, butthe benefits are more difficult to assess. One popular response has been to make
R&D customer-driven and to ask R&D's internal customers to evaluate R&D's contribution But
anecdotes and scientific evidence imply that aspects of R&D can not be evaluated easily by customers
and that R&D should not be evaluated solely on market outcomes. We address these issues by
combining qualitative interviews and mathematical modeling. We address the multiple roles of R&D
and the implications of those roles for evaluation and management. Our research began with 43
intensive interviews with Chief Technical Officers, Chief Executive Officers, and researchers at 10
research-intensive international organizations. Those interviews suggested that there are three
interrelated "tiers" of R&D -- (1) basic research explorations, (2) evaluation of research programs to
match or build core technological competence, and (3) applied research projects for, or with, business
units. The three tiers were evaluated and managed differently.
For tier 3 we derive business-unit-driven metrics and demonstrate why firms subsidize tier 3
projects to account for short-termism, risk aversion, and research scope. We derive formulae for
optimal subsidies. For tier 2, we demonstrate that some weight should be given to (internal) market
outcome metrics. However, a weight that is too large (as is implicit in popular R&D effectiveness
indices) leads to significant false selection and false rejection distortions. Instead, the firm should
complement outcome metrics with high weights on indicators of scientific, engineering, and process
efforts. Typical indicator metrics include patents, publications, citations, and peer review. For tier
1, we suggest that the research portfolio be managed for high variance, negatively correlated alternative
objectives. We also examine the implications of systems which evaluate tier 1 managers and scientists
based on the ideas they originate. Even when tier I research enables the firm to utilize better ideas
from universities and other firms, these evaluation metrics lead to systematic distortions that are
counterproductive for the firm. Specifically, the metrics lead to an over-emphasis on internal research
empires and a tendency to reject outside ideas ("not invented here"). The metrics may also lead to
fewer ideas being investigated.
We close by summarizing the R&D metrics that are now used by firms and we use our
analyses to suggest which metrics firms should use to evaluate each of the three tiers of R&D.
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R&D expenditure is often a convenient target when it comes to maintaining or increasing the company
dividend Iffact, with R&D expenditure roughly the same amount as the dividend in many companies,
it is a significant temptation.
James W. Tipping (1993, p. 13)
Director of R&D, ICI Americas, Inc.
Pioneering research is closely connected to the company's most pressing business problems....
Research must "coproduce" new technologies and work practices by developing with partners
throughout the organization a shared understanding of why these innovations are important.
John Seely Brown (1991, pp. 103-104)
Director of Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC)
Balancing Customer- and Research-Driven R&D
Research and development (R&D) provides the science and technology which firms use. to
serve tomorrow's customers profitably. Many managers, consultants, and researchers have argued
that, to succeed in the next century, R&D should be customer driven. See a review in Griffin and
Hauser (1996). John Seely Brown's comments are typical of those that we have heard from our
interviews with Chief Technical Officers (CTOs). Indeed a recent international CTO task force on
the evaluation of R&D opines that success is more likely if a product delivers unique benefits to the
user (EIRMA 1995, p. 36).
However, it is not easy for R&D to be customer-driven. If we limit our definition of the
customer to "today's customers," it might not even be desirable. R&D, almost by definition, represents
the long-term technological capability of the organization. While many successful new products are
developed based on customer needs (von Hippel 1988), an organization can not meet customer needs
if it does not have the capability to do so (EIRMA 1995). The laser was not invented to provide high
quality music or to store large quantities of data on compact disks. The US Army Research Laboratory
(ARL) and their affiliated research, development, and engineering centers (RDECs) would not have
been able to adapt rapidly to the post-cold-war era if they did not have capabilities in the basic
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research areas. By maintaining basic chemistry and chemical engineering expertise, the Hoechst
Celanese Advanced Technology Group, a major producer of chemicals for automotive tires, was able
to turn a chance discovery of a chemical process into a thriving pharmaceutical business. Other
examples include Carothers' research on linear superpolymers that led to Nylon and Westinghouse's
research on water flows through porous geological formations that led to breakthroughs in uranium
mining, the evaluation of environmental impacts for real estate development, and heat flow analyses
for high-temperature turbines and for below-ground heat pumps (Nelson 1959, Mechlin and Berg
1980). On the other hand, the great isolation of Bayer A. G.'s corporate research center was a failure
(Corcoran 1994).
More systematic analyses of R&D also suggest that basic research can not only generate
unplanned successes, but that basic research is key to the survival of corporations. Mansfield (1980)
demonstrates that, holding total R&D expenditure constant, an organization's innovative output is
directly related to the percent allocated to basic research. In a statistical study of new product
development at 135 firms, Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1995) find that adequate resources devoted to
R&D is a key driver that separates successful firms from unsuccessful firms. Bean (1995) indicates
that a greater percent of research activities in R&D (vs. business units) implies more growth. :
In order to reconcile the research favoring a customer-driven R&D focus with the research
favoring a research-driven R&D focus, we need to understand better how research activities lead to
new products. With such an understanding we can determine when and how the marketing concept
applies. We can also understand when other forces such as risk, time lags, scope, spillovers, and the
management of creative people mitigate a customer-driven perspective. To apply the marketing
concept to R&D we must understand the balance of customer input and basic science. As the John
Bush, Jr., Vice President of Corporate R&D, The Gillette Co. states: "It's the integration of activities -
- from research to sales -- that is the innovative activity in a company (Corcoran 1994, p. 15)."
This paper explores how R&D laboratories produce the technology that leads to new products.
Our methodology combines qualitative and quantitative methods. We began by interviewing 43 CTOs,
CEOs, and researchers at 10 research-intensive organizations. See table 1. We then reviewed the
public statements of CTOs, consultants, and academic researchers. (See Zettelmeyer and Hauser 1995
for more details on the qualitative interviews and Hauser 1996 for an annotated bibliography.)
Together these activities led to a qualitative description of R&D's activities. We then formalized these
descriptions of R&D and its functions in order to derive implications for the management of R&D
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and the involvement of R&D's customers.
We also seek to provide insight on the measurement and evaluation of R&D. As our opening
quote from Tipping states, R&D budgets are large and visible. They are tempting targets for
downsizing. (One of our interviewees, the CEO of a $2 billion company, said that one of his main
responsibilities was to protect the R&D budget from his business unit managers.) By understanding
how R&D works, we can understand how to measure its output. If we can measure its output, we
can value that output to determine the return on investment.
The remainder of this paper is structured into six sections. In the next section we describe
the tiered structure of R&D. We then devote a section to each tier and a section to evaluating the
output of R&D. We close with a summary and suggested extensions.
The Three Tiers of R&D
The firms we interviewed structured their research activities into tiers as indicated by the
technology pyramid in Figure 1. In many firms, management strategies and measures of success varied
by tier. Tier 1 represents basic research. We found that activities in this area are exploratory and
less tied to the market -- they concentrate on understanding basic phenomena that might have
applicability to new products. Tier 2 selected those technologies to develop further and in doing so
it fulfilled the organizations' existing strategic directions and set new ones. Tier 3 was more applied.
Research in tier 3 was usually done with funding by business units and the corporation and was often
focused on fulfilling customer needs. For completeness, we might also include tier 0 -- university
research on the basic sciences and tier 4 -- routine engineering for continuous improvement of products
and processes. Not only is the tier structure pervasive at the firms we interviewed (for example, the
US Army uses funding numbers such as 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 to describe their tiers), but it is consistent
with concepts in the R&D literature (Bachman 1972, Krause and Liu 1993, Pappas and Remer 1985,
Tipping, Zeffren and Fusfeld 1995).
One firm in our sample, which uses the word "tiers," gave us a conceptual example of having
to move massive amounts of 3D imaging data from remote oil fields to locations in the US for
analysis. Tier 1 might scan university research and/or develop basic algorithms to code the images
efficiently. Tier 2 would then select the best algorithms and develop tools (software and hardware)
to implement the programs taking into account both the business unit needs and the technological
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competence of the firm. Tier 3, in cooperation with one or more business units, would demonstrate
feasibility by using these tools and solving practical implementation issues. Routine application (tier
4) might require further engineering, but that would be done by the business units with R&D
consultation.
We have structured the tiers in a pyramid to represent conceptually the amount of funding that
is allocated to the tiers. For example, in a study of 108 corporations, Mansfield (1981) found that
roughly 5% of company-financed research was devoted to tier 1. However, this does not mean that
tier 1 is unimportant. In many ways tier 1 is the R&D lab of the R&D lab. Just as R&D develops
new products for the business units, tier 1 develops the ideas and programs that R&D uses to develop
new products. In the long run, R&D may not be successful without a tier 1 function. In some ways
the relative effort that a firm allocates to each tier reflects a decision on a long-term (tier 1) vs. short-
term (tier 3) focus. (Of course, other variables such as industry, firm size, and technology base also
affect this allocation.)
In the R&D literature many words, such as program and project, are used interchangeably
(Steele 1988). For the purpose of this paper we adopt Steele's terminology and use the words
"objectives" and/or "explorations" for tier 1 activities, the word "programs" for tier 2 activities,: and
the word "projects" for tier 3 activities. This trichotomy is somewhat arbitrary, but it enables us to
indicate clearly to which tier we refer.
Next, for each tier, we summarize the qualitative ideas from our interviews and a review of
the literature. We then structure the qualitative ideas by formalizing some aspects to gain insight into
evaluating and managing each tier. We begin with tier 3.
Tier 3. The Role of R&D's Customers
Qualitative Ideas
We heard from our interviewees that the most difficult task of tier 3 is project selection. Once
projects are selected there were many monitoring and feedback mechanisms that could be used to
allocate the optimal resources to a project. Many CTOs believed that the business units (the customers
of tier 3) have the means and information with which to judge tier 3 projects. Furthermore, they
believed that the business units were better able to judge a project's value than R&D management.
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There was a major trend to make project selection in tier 3 more customer driven.
Among the statements that we heard were: "Customer satisfaction is the number one priority."
"R&D has to be developed in the marketplace." "Customers have direct input on the team performance
and hence on the evaluation of the technical staff." "Technology assessment is 'What does it do for
the customer?"' In many firms R&D maintains its budget by "selling" projects to business units.
Many firms subsidized R&D with central funds. That is, the business units were asked to pay
only a fraction of the cost of tier 3 projects. One CTO stated that the business units could judge
research better if they did not have to pay the entire cost. For other examples of subsidies see
Corcoran (1994), Mechlin and Berg (1980), Szakonyi (1990).
We found at least three justifications for subsidies: research scope, risk, and a difference
between the time horizons of the business unit managers and the corporation. By research scope we
refer to situations where the results of a pilot test have applications beyond those for which a single
business unit pays. See also Mansfield (1982) and Vest (1995). Other business units benefit without
incurring R&D costs. For example, at Westinghouse, the water-flow research was done for the mining
division but was also applied to the real-estate, turbine engine, and heat-pump divisions. Scope
economies apply across technological disciplines as well as business units (Henderson and Cockburn
1994, Koenig 1983). For example, discoveries in chemistry might enhance research in biology. By
different time horizons we refer to the belief (expressed in our interviews) that business unit managers
have shorter time horizons than the firm and favor quick fixes for their immediate problems. See also
Braunstein and Salsamendi (1994), Hultink and Robben (1995), Negroponte (1996), and Whelen
(1976). Holmstrom 1989 adds theoretical justification that market expectations can make it rational
for management to be short-term oriented. By risk we refer to situations where a business unit
manager might decide to avoid risky projects even though their expected payoff to the firm would
otherwise be justified.
In calculating the net value of a tier 3 project, many firms recognize that they need only
commercialize those technologies that prove profitable in pilot tests (Mitchell and Hamilton 1988).
That is, the cost of commercialization is never incurred for failed pilot projects.
We now incorporate these ideas into a formal model.
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Model
We illustrate the contingent nature of tier 3 decisions with the conceptual model in Figure 2.
In collaboration with a business unit(s), tier 3 selects among potential projects and begins initial
development. For project j let the initial development costs be k. If development succeeds (with
probability pi), tier 3 observes the commercial value (tŽ0O) of the project. This commercial value is
modeled as being drawn from a probability density function, f(t). If the development fails or if the.
realized commercial value is below a cutoff (tc) then the firm can abort the project without further
costs. If the commercial value is sufficient, the firm can exercise its "option" and apply the technology
elsewhere in the business unit which participates in the research and, perhaps, to other business units.
We model this research scope as if the firm can apply the technology to mj applications at a cost of
cj for each application. Let aj be the percent of the applications that are within the business unit that
funded the research.
The parameters in Figure 2 are feasible to obtain. Many organizations feel confident in making
judgments about the expected value of a pilot test (E[tj), the probabilities of success for various
outcomes (pj), and costs (both for -the pilot application, k, and for eventual commercialization, ).
For example, EIRMA (1995) suggests that the "3 main components that must be estimated for any
project are project cost, benefits, and probability of success." See Abt, et. al. (1979), Block and Ornmati
(1987), Boschi, Balthasar, and Menke (1979), Krogh, et. al. (1988), and Schainblatt (1982) for
discussion and methods. In tier 3 we assume that mj and oa are given. In the next section we address
how tier 2 might determine these values.
To model the differences in time horizons we define yj and YF as the business unit and firm
discount factors. These factors reflect the fact that commercial values and costs are really time streams
of revenue and costs. If the business unit managers and the firm discount these time streams
differently, then the net present values for the business unit managers and for the firm will be different.
For example, in Figure 3 the sum of net revenue from 1996 to 2010 is $250 million. If the firm
discounts this time stream at 10%, the net present value is $80 million.' If the business unit manager
discounts this time stream at 20%, the net present value is $23 million. Without loss of generality,
IFigure 1 simplifies the contingent nature of R&D decisions and Figure 3 simplifies discounted cash flow calculations.
We make both simplifications to illustrate the management issues. In R&D situations managers make decisions that affect
risk thus the appropriate discount rate changes over the life of the project. For example, see Hodder and Riggs (1985).
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we normalize 'YF= and treat yi as the value relative to the firm. For example, for the time stream
in Figure 3, we calculate yj = ($23 million)/($80 million) = 0.29. For issues in the measurement of
yj see Hodder and Riggs (1985) and Patterson (1983). We allow managers to be risk averse, but do
not require them to be so.
For simplicity, we include all project costs in kj such that t is positive. We illustrate the effect
off(t) with a negative exponential distribution with expected value X. Such probabilistic processes
are common in the R&D literature and make sense -- the commercial values are non-negative and have
their maximum value at zero. When the business unit managers are risk averse we model them as
constantly risk averse with utility, u(x)=l-exp(-rx), where x is monetary outcomes and r is the risk
aversion parameter. For risk neutrality, r-O and u(x) becomes linear. We leave alternative f() and
u() to future extensions.
Analyses
In the appendix we show that the optimal cutoff t equals the cost of commercialization, cj,
and that the expected rewards (to the business unit) of the decision tree in Figure 2 are:
(1) Expected net rewards = yaJmipjJe J - kj
The computations are straightforward applications of conditional probability. The term, exp(-c/fi),
appears in the formula to represent the fact that the firm need only invest further (and incur costs of
c) when t is above the cutoff. The expected outcome from the decision tree in Figure 2 exceeds the
naive valuation, yoyajmjp(-c)-kj, that would be made if tier 3 did not anticipate the "option" nature
of the investigation.
If the business unit manager is risk neutral, he or she will value the project via Equation 1.
If the manager is risk averse, the certainty equivalent (c.e.) can be approximated by:
c.e. of expected net rewards - Rjyjajpe ¢/A - kj
(2)
where R. = 1+ rjjaj
' 1 + rAmfja.
For risk neutrality, R-1. The firm values the project differently than the business unit managers
because it earns the full value of all commercializations, discounts the value and cost streams with
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YF-l, and is not risk averse. Thus, the firm wants at least one business unit to select the project if:
(3) mEpimjXve - - kj 2 0
Subsidies
Comparing Equations 1 and 3 we see immediately that the firm has an incentive to subsidize
projects. If the business unit is asked to pay only a fraction, sj, of the project costs, then the business
unit manager will choose the same projects as the firm if:
(4) S = ayjR
In other words, the subsidy adjusts for the concentration of research scope (), short-termism (y),
and risk aversion (Rj). It varies by project because both scope and short-termism vary by project.
(Short-termism varies because the effect of a differential discount rate has a greater impact on projects
with a longer time horizon. Research scope and short-termism, in turn, affect Rj.)
In principle, the subsidy also varies by business unit because aj and yj vary by business unit.
However, the firm does not want redundant project funding. It wants either a single business unit
or a coalition of business units to fund a project. Because, in principle, the firm's profit is the sum
of its business units' profits minus central costs, the firm does not mind if other business units "free
ride" on the funding business unit's investment.
In theory, the firm can implement the subsidy with a Dutch auction, lowering si until one and
only one business unit selects the project (with the limit that the subsidy is not so low that Equation
3 is violated). In practice, the subsidies, which varied from 30% to 90% among our interviewees,
are set by a complex negotiation process that allows information to be transferred and coalitions to
form. (One manager called this "tin cuping" because, like a beggar with a tin cup, she had to go to
other business unit managers asking them to contribute to projects that she championed.) Some firms
set an average subsidy. However, this introduces selection inefficiencies whenever there is substantial
variation in o, 'y, and m>.
We summarize this section by stating the implications of Equations 1-4 as a set of qualitative
hypotheses. These hypotheses can be used for empirical testing. Equations 1-3 can be used for
explicit quantification of the value of tier 3 projects.
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Implication 1. (a) The "option value" of a tier 3 project anticipates future decisions on subsequent
investment. (b) In tier 3, firms use subsidies and implicit auctions to correct for the tendency of
business unit managers to choose projects that are more concentrated in a single business unit, have
shorter-termpayoffs, and are less risky than the firm wouldfind optimal. (c) Subsidies should be larger
(sj smaller) when projects have benefits that are less concentrated, have revenue streams over longer
periods, and are perceived as more risky.
Tier 2. Selecting Technology to Match or Create a Core Technological Strategy
Qualitative Ideas
Our qualitative interviews and the R&D literature suggest that the primary task of tier 2 is
to match expertise with strategic direction. See Adler, et. al. (1992), Allio and Sheehan (1984), Block
and Ornati (1987), Boblin, et. al. (1994), Chester (1994), EIRMA (1995), Frohman (1980), Ransley
and Rogers (1994), Schmitt (1987), Sen and Rubenstein (1989), and Steele (1987, 1988). As one of
our interviewees said: "The customer knows the direction, but lacks the expertise; researchers have
the expertise, but lack the direction."- Tier 2 provides the bridge from basic research (tier 1), which
has primary expertise in the scientific and engineering disciplines, to tier 3, which focuses on the needs
of its (internal) customers.
To fulfill its role, we found that tier 2 selected among the tier 1 explorations and developed
them to meet the firm's (strategic) needs. In selecting its research programs, tier 2 reacted to the
strategic direction of the firm, provided the means to fulfill that strategic direction, and, in turn,
modified the firm's core technological competence.
In tier 2 CTOs are judged both for their competence in developing technologies and for their
ability to align the values of R&D with those of the firm (Steele 1987). Our interviewees said that
tier 2 succeeds if it gets the programs right -- the tier 3 option-value decision tree helps determine
the right amount to invest. But researchers must also have the incentives to develop the programs
that are best strategically.
Net present value models of market outcomes are used in program selection, however, there
are concerns that such methods favor short-term, predictable, incremental programs (Steele 1988, Irvine
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1988). In contrast to tier 3, which is often evaluated on customer metrics, researchers in tier 2 (and
tier 1) are often evaluated on other indicators such as patents, publications, citations, and peer review.
See also Edwards and McCarrey (1973), Henderson and Cockburn (1994), Irvine (1988), Miller (1992),
Pappas and Remer (1985), and Shapira and Globerson (1983). We demonstrate below the tension,
when designing an evaluation system, between (1) market-value metrics that encourage managers and
researchers to choose the right programs and (2) metrics that encourage managers and researchers to
allocate sufficient scientific, engineering, and process effort to the program.
Model
Figure 4 represents our conceptual model of tier 2 activities. In step 1, tier 2 selects programs
based on the ongoing results of tier 1 explorations. Naturally, tier 2 does so anticipating potential
outcomes but taking uncertainty into account. In step 2, tier 2 evaluates each program to resolve the
uncertainty. In this evaluation tier-2 determines research scope (mi) and concentrations ('s for each
business unit). Tier 2 also clarifies any uncertainty in the value (to the firm) of the program so that
tier 3 and the firm have sufficient information to estimate the parameters for Equations 1-4. If the
program shows sufficient potential, then, in step 3, tier 2 invests significant scientific, engineering,
and process efforts to develop the program so that it can become a tier 3 project. (Process efforts
include matching technology to the customer through methods such as Quality Function Deployment
[Hauser and Clausing 1988].)
Because tier 2 selects programs to develop before it knows the outcomes of that development,
we model a key parameter, research scope, as a random variable, ij. Specifically, we model the
process of determining i as if there were M) potential applications within the firm. During
development, tier 2 determines how many of these applications apply to the firm -- a priori each
applies with a probability, q.- (Estimates of M) and qj are based on the result of tier 1 explorations
and tier 2's expertise in evaluating the outcomes of those explorations.) - We define v as the "value"
of each realized application.
We model the scientific, engineering, and process effort in step 3 with a parameter, ej, that
measures the expected result of this effort. For illustration, let the realized benefit to the firm of this
effort be a normal random variable, ej, with mean e and variance, . There is some cost to tier 2
to obtain these results and this program-by-program cost may be difficult for the firm to observe.
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We call this cost, dj(e), and assume that it is convex in e. Finally, there is some fixed cost, Kj, of
developing program j.
Each program might have different anticipated time streams of net revenues and tier 2
managers might be more short-term oriented than the firm. We model this by allowing each program
to be discounted by tier 2 by a factor, rj. We allow tier 2 managers and researchers to be (constantly)
risk averse. (We set rj=l when there is no short-termism and r-+O when managers and researchers
are risk neutral.)
To focus on key phenomena, we have abstracted our model in three ways. First, we set kj=O
in Equations 1-3, so that tier 3 will develop all projects recommended by tier 2. Analytically, we
make this abstraction to avoid the need to model explicitly tier 3's option to develop only the most
promising projects. This option-value calculation would complicate the algebra for tier 2 analyses
without providing any new insight beyond that contained in Equations 1-3. Second, we do not model
vj as a random variable because it would be redundant to do so. In principle, we could readily extend
the model to apply to random Vj as well as mi >-. Because the variance of mijv is greater when mi and
j are random, the qualitative effects that we demonstrate in this section would be the same, but larger.
Third, we model the effort allocated in step 3 but not the effort allocated in step 2. Empirically, step
3 effort is certainly the larger component of tier 2 efforts. Modeling it only in step 3 avoids
redundancy and supports asimpler exposition. The same basic intuition would apply to step 2 efforts.
except that we would need to model the interdependence of the random variables, mi and .
Goals
Many firms are adopting R&D metrics which evaluate tier 2 directly on market outcomes vs.
costs. For example, see McGrath and Romeri (1994). (Market outcomes might be based on internal
customers as well as external customers.) Such schemes are highly advocated and growing in
popularity. From our interviews we believe that such schemes distort tier 2 decisions.
To analyze this trend and to understand the potential impacts of such metrics we consider a
more general reward system in which the firm places different weights on different metrics. (This
is consistent with the practices we have observed.) Conceptually, we represent the metrics by their
ability to measure the values that result from the choice of program, the effort put into the program,
or the cost of the program. The evaluation of tier 2 managers and researchers is then:
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(5) reward = ff3niv j + pe - KK
where f3, 3 K, and ,3e are the evaluation weights set by the firm. 2 Metrics such as those advocated by
McGrath and Romeri represent a special case where /= 3e=f/K=-. The linear function suffices to
demonstrate the issues. However, one might improve upon observed practice by introducing non-linear
reward systems. We leave such systems to future analysis.
We must modify Equation 5 to represent how tier 2 managers and researchers evaluate the
rewards. First, they recognize that the effort costs, d(/e), must be subtracted. Second, they may
discount the time stream of benefits by r, but they do not discount the cost (which, by assumption,
occurs immediately). Third, if they are risk averse they will take the uncertainty in min and ej into
account and, hence, will value rewards by their certainty equivalent. In the appendix we show that
their certainty equivalent is:
(6) c.e. = ,ljqjvj - [PKKj + [3eJj - d(ej) - (r/2){[BMq(l-Pq)v + ,Be23 }
It is immediately clear that 3, and 3e must be non-zero. Otherwise, tier 2 will select no programs for
development and allocate no effort because doing so would entail costs without rewards.
In contrast to the business unit managers, the firm wants to select those programs that
maximize the expected value of the program to the firm (net of the wages the firm must pay tier 2,
managers and researchers).
The tension between choice and effort is complex. To understand this complexity we begin
by holding effort constant and illustrating how B, and/3K affect tier 2 decisions. We then hold research
scope constant and illustrate the effect of Be. We then discuss the joint effect of B, 3 K, and /3e.
2In practice, we reweight actual metrics to implement target values for the 's. For example, consider two metrics
with weights q, and 2%. Suppose the first is a measure of market outcomes, mjvj+ej and the second is a measure of effort,
e. Then, the effective weight on mjv is ,=7/ and the effective weight on ej is =',+2. A weighting of l,=l,=0K=I
implies a reward based on market outcomes, mjvj+ej, minus costs, Kj.
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Selecting the Right Programs
Temporarily ignore dj and e. Even without these effects, the presence of differential
discounting (rj<l) and risk aversion (r>O) causes the tier 2 manager's c.e. to differ from the firm's
expected rewards, Mqjv - Kj. If the weight on market outcome metrics, j,, is approximately the
weight on cost metrics, f K, then differential discounting and risk aversion might cause tier 2 managers
to reject some programs that would be profitable for the firm and to favor less profitable programs
(for the firm) over more profitable programs. We illustrate these phenomena in Figure 5 for the case
of two alternative research programs and for representative values of the parameters (given in the
appendix). We begin with Figure 5a. The horizontal and vertical axes represent the expected values
(vi) of programs 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 5a isolates the effect of discounting (with risk neutrality). (Equations are derived in
the appendix.) If tier 2 managers and researchers discount the time stream of revenue but not initial
development costs, then some programs will be falsely rejected (inverse L-shaped-region in Figure
5a). If revenues from one research program occur faster than another (IF,>r2), then tier 2 managers
and researchers will be more likely to chose the program with better short-term prospects (diagonal
false selection region in Figure 5a). We can eliminate the false rejection regions if ,3K=rIfl, but
eliminating the false selection region requires, in addition, that we allow , to vary by program. In
other words, we must reward tier 2 more for selecting programs with a longer-term payback.
Figure 5b isolates the effect of risk on false rejection. (We expanded the scale in Figure 5b,
vs. Figure 5a, in order to illustrate this effect.) When in- is a random variable and tier 2 managers
and researchers are risk averse, the certainty equivalent of the tier 2 evaluation will be less than the
expected value of the evaluation (see also Holmstrom 1989). For a given cost (K,), when the value
(v) and implied risk become large, the certainty equivalent becomes negative and tier 2 no longer finds
it attractive to begin research even though the program provides a very large expected return to the
fum. If the firm wants to eliminate this false rejection region, it must make Rj3 sufficiently small such
that the false rejection region is beyond any feasible outcome, but large enough so that tier 2 prefers
high-expected-return programs. Placing too large a weight on market outcome metrics leads to a
tendency by tier 2 to avoid high-expected-return research programs that are risky and/or long-term.
Figure 5c isolates the effect of risk on false selection. The concept is similar to that of false
rejection. In the shaded regions of figure 5c, uncertainty and risk aversion cause tier 2 managers to
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avoid high-return research programs when the returns are risky and/or long-term. The firm can
eliminate these false selection regions by making Re sufficiently small.
Figure 5d summarizes the effects of both discounting and risk. The regions are no longer as
simple, but the phenomena are the same -- discounting and risk aversion lead to regions of false
rejection and false selection when tier 2 managers and researchers are rewarded too heavily on market
outcome metrics.
Encouraging Tier 2 Scientists and Engineers to Put Enough Effort into Developing a Program
In this subsection we hold the realized scope (tj) and costs (K) constant and focus on step
3 in Figure 4. With only effort being analyzed, the selection of a weight (e) to encourage tier 2
managers and researchers to allocate optimal efforts is a standard agency theory problem. The firm
will have to "reimburse" tier 2 managers and researchers for their cost of effort (d) and for any
additional risk costs that the firm imposes by its choice of/ e. See Holmstrom (1989). In the appendix
we show that the firm can choose an "optimal" 3 such that tier 2 allocates the scientific, engineering,
and process effort that maximizes the firm's profits. The optimal weight is:
-1 o2d.*
(7) = +ra ]-
because d is convex, rjP3l E [0,1]. The better that tier 2 can anticipate the effect of its efforts the
smaller o will be and, hence, the closer r.IJ1 will be to 1.0. (Setting 3e close to 1.0 implies that most
of the variation in returns due to tier 2's effort are given or charged to tier 2.)
We now see the tension. If market outcomes were the only metrics available then they would
measure mjvj and ej simultaneously. To avoid false program choice the firm would want the weight
on market outcomes to be small, but to induce the right research and process efforts the firm would
want the weight on market outcomes to be large. One way to finesse this tension is for the firm to
find metrics that correlate with effort, but not necessarily with market outcomes. The firm can then
implement a small weight on mjvj and a large weight on ej by placing a small weight on market
outcomes and a large weight on the "effort indicator" metrics.
In tier 2 firms do appear to complement market outcome metrics with "effort indicator" metrics.
PAGE 14
EVALUATING AND MANAGING THE TIERS OF R&D
In particular, many firms use metrics such as patents, publications, citations, and peer review. Such
metrics have proven to be correlates of incremental value (and by implication) scientific, engineering,
and process effort. See Griliches (1990), Koenig (1983), Miller (1992), Stahl and Steger (1977), and
Tenner (1991). Indeed, if more than one such measure of effort is available, the firm can do better
by using a linear combination of measures (Holmstrom 1989). When the measures are independent
indicators, the "optimal" weights are inversely proportional to the variance of the measures (see
appendix for equations). Thus, when metrics such as patents, publications, citations, and peer review,
are indicators of tier 2 effort, then the firm should weigh these metrics more heavily than market
outcome metrics in an evaluation of tier 2 efforts. If these indicators can be observed before market
outcomes and if the measures are less uncertain for tier 2 managers and researchers, then such metrics
avoid distortions due to short-termism and risk aversion.
Selecting the Right Programs and Allocating Sufficient Effort to Develop Them Further
If returns to effort vary by research program, then, in step 2, for a given set of P's, tier 2 will
select among programs anticipating the effort that it will allocate in step 3. This changes the expected
value and the variance of tier 2's rewards. Technically, we incorporate this effect by redoing the
analyses that led to Figure 5. If the firm selects the reward system to maximize profit, then the firm's;
expected rewards become Mjqjv-K+ej-d, minus risk costs, where e; and d are the result of the firm
choosing the optimal 3e and tier 2 responding with the optimal efforts. Similarly, we replace e, d,
and 3 e in Equation 6 with their optimal values. For each potential program, these optimal values do
not depend upon the realized value of the research scope because itj and are independently
distributed (and managers are constantly risk averse). When we work through the algebra, these
changes reinforce the qualitative lessons above. That is, the firm can encourage the correct choice
of projects, reduce the false rejection and false selection regions, and encourage the optimal amount
of scientific, engineering, and process effort by placing a small weight on market outcome metrics
and a much larger weight on effort-indicating metrics.
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Summary and Implications for Tier 2
The primary responsibility of tier 2 is to select the right programs based on their applicability
to the core technological competence of the firm. A secondary responsibility is to develop those
programs so that they become viable tier 3 projects.
Our analysis demonstrates the tension between reward systems that are focused on encouraging
tier 2 to select the right programs and reward systems that are focused on encouraging tier 2 to allocate
the right amountof scientific, engineering, and process effort. The firm can do both if it can identify
metrics that are correlated with tier 2 efforts. It can place a high weight on effort indicating metrics
while placing a lower (but non-zero) weight on market outcome metrics.
The firm can also attempt to develop metrics that measure directly the ability of tier 2 to
choose the right projects. For example, some firms reward tier 2 managers and researchers for
"strategic vision" and for decisions that are aligned with the firm's goals (Steele 1987).
Our analysis is contrary to calls in the popular press for greater market accountability of tier
2 and is contrary to many of the schemes advocated (but not yet fully evaluated) in the R&D literature.
We predict that a simple comparison of market outcomes and research costs (e.g., McGrath and Romeri
1994) will lead tier 2 to avoid long-term and/or risky programs. (Indeed, one senior manager, who
has used market outcome metrics, indicated to us that the measures at his firm have increased in the
short-term, but may now be decreasing.) Instead, we support the practice of weighing metrics like
publications, citations, patents, and peer review more heavily than market outcome metrics.
We summarize our analyses with some testable implications.
Implication 2. Tier 2 should be evaluated on market outcome metrics such as profits, revenues, or
business-unit evaluations, but the weight on those metrics should be small. Otherwise, tier 2 willfavor
short-term projects with less risk. On the other hand, metrics such as publications, citations, patents,
and peer review should have a much higher weight if those metrics correlate with the amount of
scientific, engineering, and process effort that goes into developing a tier 2 program into a tier 3
project.
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,Tier 1 - Exploring and Recognizing New Objectives
Qualitative Ideas
Tier 1 explorations provide the raw material for tier 2 programs. Tier 1 is more likely than
the other tiers to be funded from corporate coffers; more likely to located in central laboratories; and
more likely to focus on long-term concepts. See also Chester (1994), Krause and Liu (1993),
Mansfield (1981), Mechlin and Berg (1980), Reynolds (1965), and Szakonyi (1990). It is more often
organized by scientific discipline than by markets served (see also Chester 1994). It accounts for
roughly 5-15% of R&D spending, but appears to be the seed for new ideas.
One key problem articulated by our interviewees was the selection of the right portfolio of
tier 1 objectives. However, "inventors are unlikely to know the value of their inventions in advance"
(Griliches 1990) and even the best people may be working in an area that does not prove profitable.
We observed that tier 1 managers tried to keep many explorations going so that the winning ;programs
provided a high return. In fact, one CTO told us that tier 1 learns as much from failures as successes
and that a researcher can succeed by identifying an area in which not to invest further.
A second important problem mentioned was the need to maintain expertise in the scientific
disciplines in order to identify ideas from universities, fromother firms in the industry, and from other
industries. This activity was called "research tourism." One of our interviewees stressed that their
competitive advantage was to identify and develop outside ideas better than anyone else in their
industry. Research tourism opens "new fishing grounds" for corporate development (Griliches 1990)
and spillovers can be quite large (Acs, Audretsch and Feldman 1992, Bernstein and Nadiri 1989,
Griliches 1992, Jaffe 1989, Ward and Dranove 1995). In an econometric study of 1700 firms, Jaffe
(1986) suggests that, while the direct effect of R&D spending by competitive firms lowers profitability,
the indirect effect of spillovers is sufficiently large to make the net effect positive.
However, research tourism is not easy. A common problem at many tier 1 laboratories is a
"Not Invented Here (NIH)" attitude (Griffin and Hauser 1996). The outputs of internal explorations
are easier to measure, hence it is tempting to evaluate tier 1 based on the number of internal ideas
rather than the total number of ideas.. This is perpetuated by evaluation systems (e.g., Galloway 1971)
that trace successful new products back to their idea source. Other firms encourage work within the
organization to avoid "buying" technological results (Roussel, Saad, and Erickson 1991). Incorporating
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spillovers and spin-offs appears to be one of the weaknesses of current evaluation systems (EIRMA
1995).
Evaluation of tier 1 often focused on identifying the best, most creative people who were likely
to develop new ideas (e.g., Steele 1988). We observed that management provided these people with
sufficient protected space and discretion in which to innovate. This included special privileges, such
as "Research Fellows" at IBM and 3M or "Man on the Job" at the US Army, that are not unlike the
tenure system at research universities. In some instances fame, recognition, and salary appears to
depend more on ideas that a researcher originates than on ideas that are "arbitraged" from outside
sources.
We begin with models of portfolio management. We then address research tourism and NIH.
Model
Let fvj be shorthand for the value of a program that is passed to tier 2. The distribution on
wi represents the outcome of the exploration. Let n be the total number of explorations.
Manage for High Variance and Negative Correlation
Our qualitative interviews suggest that tier 1 should look at many different ways to solve a
problem. If, at the end of the explorations, tier 1 chooses the best program to pass to tier 2, then the
value of the portfolio of n such explorations is the max(ii,, w2, ...,*,. If ij is normally distributed,
then this selection process is well-studied. See David (1970), Gross (1972), Gumbel (1958), and
Stigler (1961). The value of the portfolio is an increasing, concave function of n and is proportional
to the validity and reliability of the measures that are used to select the best program.3 The value is
proportional to the standard deviation of j. In addition, it is not difficult to show that the value of
the portfolio increases if the ii's are negatively correlated. See appendix. We state these testable
hypotheses formally as implication 3.
3 The referenced derivations are based on independent and identically distributed normal variates. The results are
approximate for other distributions. In modeling tier 2 we assumed that ,j is normally distributed and we have
approximated mi by normal variates, thus fvj should be approximately normal (subject to distortions introduced by effort
allocation and risk management). Reliability is defined as the variation (variance) in exploration value divided by the
total variation (true score plus error) of the measure. Validity is the correlation of the measure with outcomes.
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Implication 3. Tier I managers should encourage risky (high variance) explorations and manage their
portfolio to investigate alternative solutions that are negatively correlated The metrics with higher
reliably and validly, in terms of indicating which exploration from a portfolio should be advanced
to tier 2, are the better portfolio metrics. Such indicator measures are likely to be more relevant to
managing tier 1 than magnitude measures of the ultimate market outcomes.
The Right Reward System Encourages Research Tourism; the Wrong Reward System Encourages NIH
The R&D literature and our qualitative interviews suggest that many firms focus on the ideas
that are created internally. On the other hand, our interviews and the literature suggest that more and
better internal research provides a greater ability to identify and use outside ideas (e.g., Cohen and
Levinthal 1989). We now analyze whether or not a focus on original ideas is detrimental to the firm.
Let h be the number of internal explorations. We model spillovers by assuming that, for every
internal exploration, the firm can also identify 1- ideas from the outside. Let K be the cost of an
internal exploration and let Ko be the cost of each external idea that is brought into tier 1 from external
explorations. Naturally, Ko<Ki. Let V(n) be the value of the best technological solution that results
from n total explorations. Based on the discussion above, V is a concave function of n and n=h+!h.
The potential for spillovers (p>0) decreases the cost per idea, hence, for concave V, the optimal
number of ideas increases when spillovers are possible. However, even though spillovers make internal
explorations more efficient, this efficiency might imply fewer internal explorations. In the appendix
we show formally that this means that the optimal number of internal explorations might actually
decrease. We summarize this analysis as testable implications.
Implication 4. When spillovers are possible, (a) the optimal number of ideas increases but (b) the
optimal number of internal explorations might decrease.
Based on Implication 4 we can see why tier 1 managers might encourage an NIH attitude.
If a manager's status is based on the number of tier 1 explorations, then encouraging spillovers might
decrease his or her internal empire. To illustrate this more formally, suppose that the firm can evaluate
tier 1 on either internal ideas alone (the size of the research "empire") or on the total number of ideas
that are identified -- whether or not they originate in tier 1. Specifically, the firm either evaluates
Z__I______O___________·_____II___FIX;__I
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tier 1 by gh(h) or g,(n). To investigate what happens when tier 1 managers can encourage or not
encourage attention to spillovers we allow tier 1 managers and researchers to select policies that are
equivalent to choosing t from the set [O,W. Let A° be the value they choose (in their own best
interests). If z°=0 then this is equivalent to NIH; if /=j, then this is equivalent to research tourism.
To illustrate the effects of the reward system suppose that gh(h)=V[(l +i)h] and g,(n)=V(n). The firm
would choose this gh(h) if it fully expected managers and researchers to explore spillovers and
rewarded them accordingly, but did not anticipate that gh(h) would affect z°. (We obtain related results
with g,(h)=V(h) and g.(n)=V(n). If the firm were restricted to using h, but could anticipate ° it would
choose gh(h)=V(h); if it were not restricted to h, it would choose g,(n)=V(n) as the reward function.4 )
We compare gh(h) to g.(n). (See appendix for formal derivations.) When tier 1 is evaluated
on n, the reward structure of tier 1 is similar to that faced by the firm. The cost per idea decreases
with ,t, thus, like the firm, tier 1 will find it in its own best interests to set /Io=ji. Thus, its objectives
parallel those of the firm implying that tier 1 will choose the optimal number of explorations.
However, when tier 1 is rewarded on h, the cost per unit gain in gh(h) increases as /t increases, hence
tier 1 will want to keep /, ° small. With >O and "°=0, tier 1 is rewarded as if there were spillovers,
but its costs are incurred as if there were no spillovers. Because rewards are concave, this leads to
more internal explorations. This does not necessarily imply more ideas. That depends upon the
relative costs of internal and external explorations. We state these testable results as Implication 5,5
Implication 5. (a) If tier I is evaluated on all ideas, including those identified outside the firm, it will
encourage research tourism by setting '°=i and will invest in the "optimal" number of explorations.
(b) If tier I is evaluated on internal ideas only, it will adopt an NIH attitude by setting I,°=O. It will
work on more internal explorations and may developfewer ideas than would be "optimal"for the firm.
4We could analyze this as a formal agency problem, in which case, the firm could obtain maximal profits by paying
tier 1 via V(n)+u+(K,+K)/(l+l.)n-V(n) Because we have abstracted from risk in this section (it is covered in previous
sections), this makes tier I managers the residual claimants. Alternatively, we could restrict the firm to rewards of the
form g(h)+constant In this case, the optimal rewards would be g(h)=V(h). This case is analyzed in the appendix. It
provides similar, but not identical, results. We have chosen instead to compare two reward systems that we have seen
in practice. This allows us to illustrate intuitively why a common reward system might be counter-productive. We leave
the analysis of tier 1 decision making with risk aversion to future extensions.
5If tier 1 is evaluated on g(h)= V(h), then the equivalent result is that tier I will develop fewer ideas and may work
on fewer internal explorations.
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Summary and Implications for Tier 1
Our interviewees suggested that tier 1 explorations are highly speculative, uncertain, and long-
term. Only a few explorations succeed, but failures benefit other explorations. Our analyses suggest
that CTOs should encourage risky, high-variance explorations and should balance explorations within
a portfolio so that alternative (negatively correlated) approaches are taken.
Our analysis of spillovers and NIH suggests that the common practice of rewarding managers
and researchers for original ideas leads tier 1 to (1) ignore ideas that were "not invented here" and
(2) build "research empires" by investing in too many internal explorations. This may lead to fewer
ideas. The firm can be more profitable if it rewards tier 1 for ideas created and brought in from the
outside.
Metrics to Evaluate R&D
Arthur Chester (1995), Senior Vice President for Research and Technology for GM Hughes
Research Laboratories, states that: "measuring and enhancing R&D productivity or R&D effectiveness
... has gained the status of survival tactics for the R&D community." R&D evaluation is an important
policy issue in Japan (Irvine 1988) and Europe (EIRMA 1995). Good measures enable CEOs and
CTOs to evaluate people, objectives, programs, and projects and, in many ways, determine the size
of the corporate investment in tiers 1, 2, and 3. Metrics serve many purposes including pre-evaluation,
monitoring, and post-evaluation (EIRMA 1995, Irvine 1988).
The analysis of specific measures and the derivation of quantitative weights on those measures
is an empirical question and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, our analyses provide
qualitative insight into what should be measured.
First, it is clear that metrics must vary by tier. While customer metrics make sense for tier
3, they make less sense for tiers 1 and 2. Effort indicators such as publications, citations, patents,
and peer review make more sense for tier 2 than for tier 3. Tier 1 is even further from the market,
hence indicators of the quality of the people become more important.
Tier 3 can be customer driven if scope, discounting distortions, and risk are taken into account.
Equation 3 suggests explicit post-evaluation measures for tier 3. Equation 2 provides the value to
a business unit. These metrics include measures of scope, discounting, and risk, and apply across
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business units -- they capture more than the willingness of a business unit to pay for the R&D. To
evaluate the incremental investment in tier 3 we use Equation 3 recognizing that there are also input
costs associated with the combined output from tiers 1 and 2. To the extent that the outputs of tiers
1 and 2 are internal to R&D, Equation 3 minus tier 1 and 2 costs provides a post-evaluation measure
of R&D. For pre-evaluation and monitoring we can use an internal market system (with the business
units as customers) if the subsidies (Equation 4) are set appropriately.
Tier 2 metrics might include customer-driven measures, but they should not be weighted too
heavily (, positive but not too large). Tier 2 should rely more on effort indicators such as patents,
publications, citations, and peer review. Because risk costs and discounting distortions might vary
based on whether the focus is pre-evaluation, monitoring, or post-evaluation, the weights on the O's
might change by focus.
Tier 1 should be the least customer-driven. Metrics for tier 1 should capture portfolio issues
through "max of n" calculations that take explicit account of variances and correlations. The portfolio
rather than specific objectives should be the focus of the metrics. Furthermore, the firm should
evaluate tier 1 based on all ideas, whether they originate inside or outside the firm.
Table 2 provides a list of the metrics that were used by our interviewees. We have indicated
the tier for which they are most appropriate. Notice that some are explicit attempts to measure
incremental value (e.g., economic value added), but many are surrogates for incremental value (e.g.,
customer satisfaction, time to market, revenue from new products). This reflects the reality and the
difficulty of actual measurement. It is an exciting and wide-open research area.
Summary and Future Research
Our analyses have attempted to model those aspects of tier 1, 2, and 3 that our interviewees
indicated to be important. In tier 3 we focused on corporate subsidies to account for business units'
tendency to undervalue long-term, risky projects with less concentrated benefits. In tier 2 we focused
on the tension between program selection and program development to demonstrate how managers
might balance direct measures of downstream value with indicators of effort. The right balance avoids
false selection and false rejection while encouraging sufficient scientific, engineering, and process
effort. In tier 1 we focused on exploration portfolios and on the need to discourage NIH attitudes.
Together these analyses provide the basis with which to assess alternative R&D metrics.
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We feel that, we have made progress toward a tiered theory of R&D evaluation and
management, but there are many interesting areas that have yet to be addressed. We suggest a few.
Once a project is selected, the firm must motivate tier 3 researchers to allocate the optimal
effort to a project. To address this issue one might combine the output measures of Equations 1 and
2 with internal customer evaluation systems. See Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt (1996). This might
be extended to a fully integrated "optimal" reward system that covers all of the interrelationships
among the tiers.
Self-selection on risk aversion is an important phenomenon for researchers and managers.
If we reward tier 3 researchers on outcome metrics such as those in Equations 1 and 2, then the
uncertainty of the reward system imposes risk costs on tier 3 researchers. If we use less risky effort
indicators in tiers 2 and 3, then we might find that the reward system encourages risk averse scientists
to avoid tier 3 research. See also suggestions in Holmstrom (1989). We might also explore whether
an internal-idea metric helps the firm select which researchers to assign to tier 1.
Our analyses suggest one way to set research subsidies. However, our interviewees suggest
that the means by which subsidies are set involve a negotiation process among business units, CTOs,
and CEOs. If some business units have better information about a project than others, we could image
more strategic behavior by those business units. Some business unit managers may withhold support
from promising projects while waiting for another business unit to fund the project or may skew
information to redirect the firm's focus (Rotemberg and Saloner 1995). Future research might address
this complex gaming and explore issues such as internal patent systems or research tournaments
(Taylor 1995). Similarly, we might extend our analyses to strategic gaming between firms.
Our construct of scope (mi) is related to the growing interest in platform management -- the
use of the same core technology across a variety of products (Utterback 1994). One example of a
successful platform design is Hewlett Packard's use of ink-jet technology in a full range of printers,
fax machines, and other document hardware. Many of our analyses can be modified to study platform
management.
Some of our interviewees described an interesting dynamic phenomenon: "growing technical
managers." They indicated that one core competence of the firm might be a corporate system in which
R&D acts like a crucible in which technical managers survive if they understand both technical issues
(tier 1) and business issues (tier 3).
Throughout this paper we have made a number of simplifications to illustrate key phenomena.
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We believe that these phenomena generalize to more complex models. Generalizations to other utility
functions, other probability density functions, more complex decision trees, etc. could prove interesting.
Finally, there are many personal and cultural issues in a research community. Many scientists
are driven by an inherent need to know and many scientists believe strongly in a research culture.
Some of these beliefs might be the result of self-selection while others might be a "thoughtworld"
cultural indoctrination. Hopefully, our analyses are complementary to these sociological and
anthropological approaches to R&D management.
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Table 1. Managers Interviewed






Schlumberger Measure. & Systems
Electricite de France
Cable & Wireless plc
Polaroid Corporation




President, Head of Strategic Research, R&D Portfolio Manager
President, VP Technology, VP Commercial Development, VP
Technology & Business Assessment, Director Innovations
VP Administrative Systems, Director of R&D Programs, Direc-
tor of Information Applications Architecture
Senior VP for Strategic Planning, Head of Corporate Research
VP Director of R&D, Director of Engineering Process Devel-
opment, Director of European Tech. Cooperation
Associate Director R&D, Director of Division
Federal Development Director, Director of Technology (HK),
Group Strategic Development Advisor
CEO, Director of Research
Associate Director for Science and Technology, Associate
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Effectiveness of a new system
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Appendix: Derivations and Proofs
April 12, 1996
For ease of exposition, we temporarily drop thej subscript in the derivations for tiers 2 and 3. We assume
that all functions are thrice differentiable and, when appropriate, all maxima are interior.
Tier 3: The Role of R&D's Customers
Equation 1.. Following the decision tree in Figure 2, we obtain expected net rewards=,y[(1-p)O+
pProb(t<t}.O+p Probt>tJ(. am(Eftlt>_J-c))J minus the costs, k Using the properties of the
exponential process we obtain Prob(t>t}=exp(-tnA) and e[tlttJ=X+t. Alternatively, we obtain the result
by direct integration of f(t)=X'exp(-t/A). Thus, by substitution and simplification, the expected net
rewards= yamp(X+t-c)exp(-t/X)-k Differentiating the expected net rewards and setting the derivative
to zero yields t=c. Finally, substitution yields Equation 1.
Equation 2. Consider first the rewards. E(u)=(1-p) O+pProb(t<tJ.O+p.Prob(t>_t}E[u(ycmt-
- ' c)]. Dropping terms that equal zero,-substituting definitions, and using the properties of the exponential.
process, we obtain:
E[u] = pe -t f(l-e -rym(t-c)X-e -(t-Ydt
(A) t
-pti'| -e7Vd -e -may(t~-c) -(rmay)x.-le
-xlx
oi f ng ta o40 oa
Recognizing the first integral as an integration over the range of a probability density function and the
second integral as the Laplace transform of the exponential density, we obtain:
(A2) Elu] = pe-td[l e nn y ]
Solving for the optimal cutoff (t,=c) and substituting yields:
(A3) E[u = rm ypeAI 1A]
For the constantly risk averse utility function, c.e. = -(1/r)log[1 - E(u)]. If we substitute Equation A3 into
the expression for the c.e. and if we approximate log[l-z]-z + second order terms, we get the result in
the text. Because the utility function is constantly risk averse, we just subtract the certain costs, k. When
the approximation does not hold, we use Equation A3 directly.
Equation 3. The derivation of value to the firm follows that for the business unit (manager)
except that yF=l and a=l. Equation 3 derives from (risk neutral) condition that expected value > costs.
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Equation 4. With subsidies, the conditions for the business unit (manager) to select a project are
RyoxmpX exp(-cA) > sk. If s=oryR, then this is equivalent to Equation 3. If the business unit manager is
risk neutral, then R=l.
Tier 2: Selecting Technology to Match or Create a Core Technological Strategy
Equation 5 is a definition.
Equation 6. Following the text we assume that the scope, i, results from M independent draws
from a Bernoulli process with success probability q. Thus, the expected value and variance of the tier 2
(manager's) rewards are:
(A4) E[rewards] = vMqv - 3KlK + - Pre - d(e)
(As) var[reward] = pV2Mq(1 -q)v 2 + 2C2
We use the DeMoivre-Laplace Theorem (Drake 1967, p. 219) to represent the Bernoulli process outcomes
with a normal approximation. For normally distributed outcomes and constantly risk averse utility
functions, the c.e. =expected value-(r/2)(variance of outcomes). (The result is also approximate for other
density functions.) For both results see Keeney and Raiffa (1976, PP. 161, 202). This gives Equation 6
in the text.
Figure 5a. To demonstrate the effect of discounting we, temporarily, ignore e, assume risk
neutrality and focus on E[rewards]. The minimum cutoff for the firm is then, v>K/(Mq). For the business
unit managers (BU), we rearrange equation A4 to obtain the cutoff as v>([B(3,)K/(rMq). The conditions
for choosing program 2 over program 1 are then:
(A) BU: v2 Mlq1 rV1 + (K 2 -K
M2 q2 2 IPv1'2 M2 q2
(A6) Firm: v2 Mlqv + (K2 -K1)
M2q2 M 2q2
Figure 5b. We now allow the BU to be risk averse. The firm's cutoff value does not change,
but the BU minimum c.e. condition becomes: 3r'Mqv-(r/2)i2(r2 Mq(-q)v>_3K. This quadratic equation
will yield both a minimum cutoff (v too small) and a maximum cutoff (v too risky). That is:
(A7) v [ - -2 lp.r(1-q)Mq[rP[rP(1-q)]
(A8) v [ +1 -2[g3K(1 -q)/Mq]([r3yP(1 -q)]
Figure 5c. The conditions for choosing program 2 over program 1 become r'2M 2q2v2-
(r/2)PV2r22Mq2(l -q)v:-K22:_KK2r ,Mqlvl-(r/2)~l2r:2Mtq, (l-q)v,-KK!. This is a quadratic equation which
will yield hyperbolic boundaries in (v,,v)-space. For Figure 3c we have used the special conditions of
K,=K2 and M 2q2/Mq=(-q2)/(1-q). These conditions reduce the boundaries to straight lines to
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demonstrate the regions more clearly. The intuitive reasoning for Figure 3c is that, for a given v2, as v,
gets very large, program 1 becomes less attractive due to risk. There will be regions where the BU prefers
a less risky program 2 over program 1 even though program 1 has a higher expected value.
Figure 5d. The effects from both figures 5b and 5c are plotted. The specific values used are
K,=K2=2, Mq,=10, M2q2=8, r,=.9, r2=.6, 3,=fK=, and r=2 (Figures 5b,c,d) or r=O (Figure 5a).
Equation 7. Following the arguments above, the certainty equivalent for a given e is given by:
c. e. = Mqv-(r/2)S22 Mq(1-q)v 2-1K+Fe-d(e)-r2a2/2. Since v is given, this reduces to c. e. =constant+
re-d(e). The tier 2 manager will choose e such that (ad/ae)=rI'. By the Implicit Function Theorem,
t ' ': 'this implies (8e/O)=r(T(2 d/8e2)-'. In equilibrium, the firm must reimburse the tier 2 manager for effort.
and risk costs, thus the firm will maximize (e-d(e)-rSe2r2a2/2). Recognizing that e is an implicit function
of fe, we solve this maximization problem to obtain Equation 7. We find the optimal efforts, e', by
solving (ad/e)=[1 +ra,2(a2d//ae2) '.
Effort Indicators. Suppose that y and z are effort indicators, such as patents, publications,
citations, or peer review, and suppose that y,z are jointly distributed as independent normal variates with
variances, a 2 and a2, respectively. Both have means of e. Holmstrom (1979) demonstrates that the
optimal contract is linear in y.and z. Using this fact, we derive the tier 2manager's optimal e.for a given;
set of weights, ay and a. This yields (acd/e)=ay+a2. (Note that r=I for the indicators since the tier 2
manager is paid now rather than later based on the indicators.) · The Implicit Function Theorem yields
ae/8ay=8e/aa, =(82d/8e2)'. The firm will then set wages to assure that the tier 2 manager participates, that
is, the c.e. of the wages will at least equal the tier 2 manager's reservation wage. Because, in equilibrium,
it must reimburse for effort and risk costs, the firm will maximize (e-d(e)-ra/a/y2/2-ra/2o2/2). Recognizing
that e is an implicit function we solve this maximization problem to show that ayaY2=ao z. This is -the
result quoted in the text.
Tier 1: Exploring and Recognizing New Objectives
v arance ana correlaton. uross 1I /IZ), among otners,
demonstrates that for W=max(,, 2 , Wi, E[W] is B1 
proportional to the variance of iW when the iw are i.i.d. normal -------
variates. To prove that larger negative correlation leads to
larger expected values we work with the cumulative density C3 W
function for W. That is:
w w w I
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Figure Al. Visualization of Proof
We then divide the space by the hyperplanes for W = 4±W for
all j. This yields a series of regions. The formal proofs are tedious, but we can sketch the idea for J=2.
For example, for J=2 we get the regions in Figure Al. For zero-mean variates with aZ=a22 , we switch
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integration over the A2 region increases as correlation increases. Thus, F(W) increases as correlation
increases. Finally, this implies that E[W] decreases as correlation increases. To see the result more
intuitively, consider the special case of the bivariate correlation equal to +1 or -1. In the former case, it
is as if there were only one draw, hence E[W=O. In the latter case it is if we drew only the absolute
value of i,, hence E[W]=E[ivJi,LvO]>O.
Not Invented Here
I.. .:mplication 4. When spillovers are possible. (a) the optimal number of ideas increases but (b) the optimal.
number of internal programs might decrease.
(a) We show an/al>O. The firm wishes to maximize V(n)-Kh-Koh with n=h+!th. Hence, the firm
maximizes V(n)-[(c,+lKo)/(++lt)]n which implies the optimality condition of a V(n)/n=(K+4Kod)/( 1 +JL).
Implicit differentiation yields an/alc=[aV(n')/an'2 l(Ko-K)/(l+uL)2. Thus, n/a>0O because V(n) is
concave and K<K,. (The firm prefers to be as large as possible because c{V[h'+h']-Kjh'-,Aoh}/)al=
[av(n)/an-Kh=[(K,+l K)/(l+,.)-Kjh'>O for 14>0.)
(b) To prove the result we must only establish that an example exists such that internal programs decrease.
We establish existence with the example V(n)=VOlog(n+l). Notice that V(n=O)=O. For this example we
show that h'/aL is ambiguous. In terms of h, the firm maximizes (Volog(h+lth+l)-Kh-KOlzh}.
Differentiating and solving for h' yields: h'=V(Kf,+iK)-/(1+1). For h'>O, this requires
V/(K,+uKo)>l/(l+(+). Differentiating again we obtain: ah'/Aa=l/(1 +) 2-(K/v)(Vo2/[K,+ .La 2 ). ForKo,-.O,
ah'/1Ct>O. For Ko-*K,, ch'/al--[1-VJKJ/(1 +) 2 , hence ah'/cgl<O whenever V>K,. This last condition is
necessary for n'>O. (If n' were not positive; there would be no need for tier 1.) 0
Implication 5. (a) If tier 1 is evaluated on all ideas, including those identified outside the firm, tier 1 will
set u°=i and invest in the "optimal" number of explorations for the firm. (b) If tier 1 is evaluated on
internal ideas only, it will adopt an NIH attitude by setting u=O. It will work on more internal
explorations and may develop fewer ideas than would be "optimal" for the firm.
(a) We first consider the case when tier 1 managers and researchers are evaluated on g,(n)=V(n). Tier
1 managers and researchers will select and n to maximize V(n)-K/(l+l~)-KoCtn/( +))}.
Differentiating, we obtain: acV(n)-K/(1 +l)-K on/(l+t]))/dCg=n(K,-KO/(1 +/)>0. Thus, =ju. With A"°=
and g(n)=V(n), tier l's objectives match those of the firm.
(b) Following the text, we now consider the case when tier 1 managers and researchers are evaluated on
gh(h)=V[(l+)h] where fi is announced by the firm as a parameter of the reward function. Tier 1
managers and researchers select t° and h to maximize (gh(h)-Kh-K0o/h}. Since c(gh(h)-Kh-Ko°h/Cag<O,
tier 1 managers and researchers will set O°=0. The revised optimal h is given by
av(h°+jih)/an=K/(1l+l). The firm's optimal is given by V(n')/n=(K,+jKo)/( (l+j) where n=(l+ji)h'.
Hence, aV[hF°( +i)]/8n<aV[(l+j)h'/8n. Since V() is concave, this implies that (+ji)h°>(1 +i)h', hence
h°>h' . We establish the ambiguity of the comparison of n° with n by using the example from Implication
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4 to prove existence. Because tier 1 managers and researchers set ~ =O, n°=h°. We compute h°=[V,(l +Z)-
KJ/(K+KIj) and n*=[Vo(I +)-KxKoJ,]/(K+K). As K,--K, h>n'. As Ko,-O, n*>ho by the condition that
h*>O. 
Footnotes 4 and 5. If ,(h)=V(h) then tier 1 may work on more internal explorations and will develop
fewer ideas than would be "optimal" for the firm.
The reasoning of these footnotes covers the case where the firm rewards only on internal ideas, but
-anticipates that tier 1 will adopt NIH and set °=O. Under these restricted conditions (and no risk
aversion) the firm will select gh(h)=V(h). With O°=O, tier 1 maximizes V(h)-K,h, hence aV(h°)/ah=K, and
n°=h°. The firm's optimal is given by aV(n')/an=(Kj+Ko)/(+i). Thus, ho=no<n* because V() is
concave and K,>(K+W'Kj)/(]+). We establish the ambiguity of h° vs. h' with the example of Implication
4. We first compute h=(V-K)/Ki and h'=[Vo(l +)-Krox]/[(K+Koi)(Jl +)]. As Ko-O, h'>h and as Ko---IKC,
h*<h°. a
